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LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE GRANT OF THREE SEATS TO
RUSSIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER
N. S. TIMASHEFFt
I.
AMONG the signatories of the Charter of the United Nations, signed
in San Francisco on June 26, 1945, one finds, in addition to the
representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, representa-
tives of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic1 and of the Ukrainian
Soviet Socialist Republic; in other words, of two of the sixteen constitu-
ent republics2 composing the Soviet Union. Consequently, all the three
States are entitled to seat§ in the General Assembly of the new organi-
zation. A double anomaly appears in these facts: (1) In an international
organization, both a federal government and governments of subsidiary
federated units appear as coequal partners;3 (2) out of the sixteen
constituent republics of the Union, only two are allowed to play that
unusual part, though nothing, in the Constitution of the Soviet Union,
could be found implying a privileged position of these two as compared
with the remaining fourteen.
In the opinion of the representatives of the Soviet Union, the second
of these anomalies is just a temporary one: Speaking at a meeting of
the heads of the delegations of the individual nations, Dmitry Z.
Manuilsky, chairman of the Ukrainian delegation at the United Nations
Conference, pointed to the fact that there were a number of small na-
tions of Eastern Europe which were not represented at the conference.
This statement was taken by those present as an indication that the
entrance of the Ukraine and Byelorussia into the new organization
j Associate Professor of Sociology, Fordham University.
1. The Byelorussian Republic is commonly called White Russia. The text follows the
official publication of the Charter by the Department of State (Publication No. 2353,
Conference Series No. 74).
2. The term "constituent republic" is used to designate the members of the Soviet
Union, in contradistinction to the "autonomous republics" which are territorial subdivisions
of the constituent republics. The English terminology differs from author to author; the
above text follows the translation of the Constitution of 1936 by Mrs. Anne Louise
Strong which, in the present writer's opinion, is the best available; STRoxG, Tna NEw
Sovxi" CoNsiTTr Ox (1937) 121-161.
3. There is an obvious difference as compared with the signature of the Charter by
representatives of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and repre-
sentatives of the dominions: the signature of the former does not cover the dominions
whereas the signature of the representative of the Soviet Union also covers the areas of
the Ukraine and Byelorussia.
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would be followed by requests that other Soviet States should even-
tually be represented.4
Whether such a request will ever be granted, depends on a decision
of the General Assembly of the new organization upon the recommenda-
tion of the Security Council,5 and very definitely this decision Will be
political, just as the grant of membership to the Ukraine and Byelorussia
was: it is well known that this grant was part of a deal between the
"Big Three" concluded at Yalta. The political aspect of the questio
is beyond the scope of this paper. The problem to be discussed here is
this: Is there any juridical ground for granting two, or more, of the
constituent republics of the Soviet Union membership in the United
Nations and, consequently, seats in its General Assembly? In other
words: Is the legal status of these republics identical with, or similar
to that of the sovereign nations who have signed the Charter?
The discussion of this problem can be best initiated by establishing
these facts:
1. The Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, as organized accord-
ing to the original Constitution of July 6, 1923, and by the new (so
called, Stalin) Constitution of December 5, 1936,' is a federal state
involving the existence of a federal government and of a number of
governments of the constituent republics. 7
2. Up to February 1, 1944, there was no doubt that the constituent
republics of the Union could not be conceived as virtual members of
an international organization since foreign relations and military affairs
were numbered among the exclusive powers of the federal government.
3. On February 1, 1944, a Constitutional Amendment was passed
by the Supreme Soviet of the Union8 granting the constituent republics
participation in the conduct of foreign relations and military affairs,
with the special purpose of raising the international status of the repub-
4. N. Y. Times, June 19, 1945, p. 8, col. 2.
S. Charter, Art. 4, § 2.
6. In this paper, the real meaning of the Constitution in the light of the one-party
system (referred to in Article 126 of the Constitution of 1936) will be touched upon only
incidentally.
7. The number of the constituent republics was- originally 4; it was raised to 7 in
1924, to 11 in 1936 (by the new Constitution) and to 16 by the annexations of 1939-40
which resulted in the admission of the Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Finno-Karelian
and Moldavian republics.
8. According to Article 146 of the Constitution of 1936, constitutional amendments are
effected by decisions of the Supreme Soviet of the Union (roughly corresponding to the
Congress of the United States) adopted by a two-thirds majority of a joint session of
the two houses of which it consists. In contrast to the American practice, the amendments
are not numbered and are incorporated into the text of the Constitution.
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lics. Obviously, this Amendment cannot be understood outside of the
framework of the Union, a relationship between the Soviet Union and
the constituent republics as stated in the Constitution, which will be
later developed.
IT.
Article 13 of the Constitution of 1936 explicitly states that the Union
of the Soviet Socialist Republics is a federal state formed on the basis
of the voluntary union of several Soviet Socialist republics, equal in
rights. Since this Constitution was enacted by the legislative body of
an already existing Union,1" no direct reference to the origin of the
latter is made. But it may be assumed that the legal basis of the original
Constitution of 1923, the Treaty of Union signed December 30, 1922,
by the four original republics, is still in force. This points to the fact
that the origin of the Soviet Union is different from that of the United
States and is rather similar to that of the German Empire (1871). In
this Treaty of Union it was not the people of the Soviets as a collective
unit, but the peoples of the individual republics as represented by their
governments who decided "to unite into one federal State."
This difference of origin does not however imply any basic political
difference in the organization of the two Unions, the Soviet and the
American. The main principle of the Union-constituent republics
relationship is namely this: a certain number of powers enumerated in
Article 14 of the Constitution are delegated to the Union and, according
to Article 15, outside of these limits ". . . each constituent republic
shall exercise state power independently."'" The list of the powers dele-
gated to the Union is however much longer than that comprised in
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of the United States, and this
for two reasons: (1) the practice of the United States and of other
federations concerning "implied powers" has been taken into considera-
9. In a speech at the meeting of the Supreme Soviet, Mr. Molotov, the People's
Commissar for Foreign Affairs, said: "The absence of special provisions in the Soviet
Constitution as regards the rights of the constituent republics to exchange representations
with other states and to maintain foreign relations is sometimes interpreted to the direct
detriment of the interests of the Soviet Union as a whole. The proposed amendment will
serve to eliminate facts of this kind." This speech was published in Izvestia (the official
paper of the Supreme Soviet), February 2, 1944. Later on, this speech will be referred
to as "Molotov's speech."
10. It was then the Union Congress of the Soviets (superseded in 1936 by the Supreme
Soviet of the Union).
11. This is a counterpart of the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
which is commonly considered to be merely declaratory and to have "added nothing to
the instrument as originally ratified." United States v. Sprague, 282 U. S. 716, 733 (1931)
United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U. S. 100, 123 (1941).
[Vol. 14
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tion, and a number of particular powers have been consequently
explicitly mentioned; (2) the Soviet Union is a socialist State exercising
a number of activities which, in other states, are carried out by private
individuals, and a large part of these activities belong to the federal level.
For the purposes of this paper it is sufficient to note that the list
of the federal powers, as stated in the Constitution of 1936, comprised
these items:'. "(a) Representation of the Union in international rela-
tions, conclusion and ratification of treaties with other states; (b)
Questions of war and peace... ; (g) Organization of the defense of the
USSR and the direction of all the armed forces of the USSR."
In Articles 17, 18, 57-63 and 79-88 of the Constitution" devoted to
the structure and powers of the constituent republics no mention of
foreign relations or military affairs was made, and the fact that, prior
to February 1, 1944, diplomacy and national defense were entirely under
the jurisdiction of the Union was stressed in Molotov's speech at the
session of the Supreme Soviet devoted to the Constitutional Amend-
ment.' 4 In these regards, the Soviet Constitution was more centralized
than the Constitution of the United States which recognizes the possi-
bility of the states entering into direct relations with foreign powers,
provided the consent of Congress is obtained, 5 and keeps within the
hands of the state authorities the actual training of the militia, the
12. The individual clauses are designated by letters of the Russian alphabet; by neces-
sity, they must be replaced by letters of the Latin alphabet.
13. These articles have no counterpart in the American Constitution which is satisfied
with the guaranty of the republican form of government in the individual states (Art. IV,
§ 4). "All the States had governments when the Constitution was adopted. . . . These
governments the Constitution did not change." Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 175
(U. S. 1874). In the Urlited States, the Constitution recognizes state powers resident in
the state before the Constitution was adopted; the Constitution circumscribed and limited
the powers of the federated states. On the contrary, the major lines of the constitutions
of the constituent republics are fixed by the Constitution of the Soviet Union.
14. According to Molotov's speech, even prior to the Constitutional Amendment of
February 1, 1944, there were, in the Red Army, national army formations (Lithuanian,
Estonian, Latvian, Georgian and so on). These were, however, detachments composed
of nationals of the individual republics (just as in the Army of the United States there
may be divisions composed of New Yorkers, Texans, and so on), but having had no legal
attachment to the political framework of the several republics.
15. Art. I, § 10, cl. 3. "There have been few instances in which the States have sought,
. . . to enter into agreements with foreign States, and there are therefore few cases in
which the courts have been called upon to determine what kinds of agreements may thus,
with congressional approval, be entered into between the States and foreign States."
1 WnIouGHBY, THE CoNsT1uTToN or THE UNTrEID STATES (2d ed. 1929) 306. The reason
is obvious: "If these compacts are with foreign nations, they interfere with the treaty-
making power, which is conferred entirely on the general government." Barron v. Mayor,
etc. of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, 249 (U. S. 1833).
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appointment of militia officers1" and the entire government of the militia
forces except when they have been called into the service of the federal
government. But the provisions of the Soviet Constitution of 1936
have been changed in 1944; the change will be studied in a later section.
Returning to the general structure of the Union-constituent republics
relationship, one more similarity with the United States Constitution
can be stressed: According to Articles 19 and 20 of the Soviet Consti-
tution: "The laws of the USSR shall have like force in the territories
of all constituent republics: In case of conflict between a law of a
constituent republic and a law of the Union, the all-Union law shall
prevail." This is a restatement of Article VI, Section 2, of the Federal
Constitution making "This Constitution and the laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... the supreme Law
of the Land . .,,"8
In two other regards, significant differences appear between the Rus-
sian and American patterns of a Constitution. First of all, Article 17
of the Soviet Constitution reserves to each of the constituent republics
the right freely to secede from the Union.'9 Secondly, whereas the
government of the United States is dual' and ". . . the Federal and
State Governments act independently of each other,"'" the govern-
16. Art. I, § 8, cd: 16. As has been authoritatively stated, "Whilst Congress shall
prescribe . . . a uniform militia system for the States, securing the enrollment of all
able-bodied white male citizens, and maintaining the system of discipline and field exercise
observed in the regular army, yet that the details of militia organization and management
[are] left to the State governments." Power of President to Create a Militia Bureau in
the War Deparment (1861) 10 Ops. ATT'v GEN. 11, 13; Conway, A State's Power of
Defense (1942) 11 Fo~Ambas L. Rav. 170-192; BzcEV:xwzv, HoLLAND, BAcoN, McGovmRr,
LAWruL Acno OFr STATa MITArAaY FoRcEs (1944).
17. United States ex rel. Gillett v. Dern, 74 F. (2d) 485 (App. D. C. 1934).
18. In contradistinction to the United States Constitution, the Soviet Constitution, in
these articles, is not stated to be the supreme law of the land. This is due to the fact that
in Russian legal terminology, the Constitution is called and understood to be "The Funda-
mental Law."
19. The real unity of the Soviet Union is based on the unity of the Communist Party
which is one for the whole area. Directions against the use of the right of secession
were addressed to the members of the Party immediately after the formation of the Union.
In the thirties, a number of trials took place in different parts of the Union against persons
who allegedly desired to use the right of secession. Compare the contrary doctrine regard-
ing the rights of secession in America under the United States Constitution. Texas v.
White, 7 Wall. 700 (U. S. 1868).
20. "The Constitution contemplates a national government free to use its delegated
powers; also state governments capable of exercising their essential reserved powers. . .
Helvering v. Therrell, 303 U. S. 218, 223 (1938).
21. 1 WILLouGuBY, op. cit. supra note 15, at 120; Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506
(U. S. 1859).
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mental organization of the Soviet Union is carried out on three levels:
(1) Union, (2) republican (corresponding to state in America) and,
(3) between them, joint, Union-republican administration. For the
understanding of the bearing of the Constitutional Amendment of
February 1, 1944, this is a highly important point and therefore detailed
explanation is needed.
According to Articles 64 and 79 of the Constitution, the highest execu-
tive and administrative organ of the Union and of each of the con-
stituent republics is the Council of W eople's Commissars. Articles 77,
78 and 83 of the Constitution enumerate the commissariats the heads
of which form the Councils just mentioned' and, in combination with
other articles, divide them'into three classes: (1) Union, (2) Union-
republican and (3) republican. In this division, the tripartite division
of the Soviet administration is manifested.
(1) The Union commissariats ". . . direct the branches of state
administration entrusted to them throughout the territory of the U.S.S.R.
either directly or through- organs appointed by them" (Article 75); in
their activity, the constituent republics do not participate. But repre-
sentatives of these commissariats are appointed to the Councils of
People's Commissars of the constituent republics (Article 83) and
participate in their deliberations and decisions with the same rights
as the commissars of the constituent republics.' For the purposes of
this paper it must be stressed (1) that the Union commissariats approxi-
mately correspond to the departments forming the federal administra-
tion in this country and (2) that, up to February 1, 1944, the Com-
missariats for Foreign Affairs and Defense belonged to this category.
(2) The very existence of Union-republican commissariats forms a
particularity of the Soviet structure; their activity can be characterized
as joint administration of the Union and the constituent republics. If
a branch of state activity, say, police, public health or justice, is under
joint adminstration, then there exists: (1) one central commissariat
directing the activity throughout the Union, its head being a member
of the Union Council of People's Commissars, and (2) sixteen commis-
22. The enumeration, in the Constitution, of the individual Commissariats (as well
as of the territorial divisions of the constituent republics) is the cause of the frequency
of constitutional amendments.
23. It is noteworthy that according to Article 67 of the Constitution of 1923, the repre-
sentatives of the Union Commissariats in the constituent republics enjoyed either full
membership in the Council of the People's Commissars of the republic, or merely a
deliberative voice in its midst, depending on a decision of the supreme legislative body
of the republic. To understand what the provision of the Constitution of 1936 really
means, one should imagine that the President of the United States would be granted the
power to appoint his representatives to the governors' councils of the individual states.
1945]
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sariats, one in each of the constituent republics, its head being a member
of the Council of the People's Commissars of the republic, but, in addi-
tion to this, an officer subordinate to the Union commissar.24 As a rule,
the central commissariat directs the branches of state administration
entrusted to it through like-named People's Commissariats of the con-
stituent republics, but it may directly administer a definite number of
enterprises. (Article 76). The term "enterprise", though exactly trans-
lating the Russian term, is a misnomer. Some of the joint commissariats
really directly administer large economic units, but other ones directly
administer big hospitals, concentration camps and the like. To make
the relationship of the central and the "like-named" republican commis-
sariats entirely clear, Article 87 of the Constitution states that in the
constituent republics the Union-republican commissariats are subordi-
nate both to the Council of the People's Commissars of the constituent
republic and to the corresponding Union-republican commissariat of
the Union." This is a structure to which no counterpart exists in the
United States. Anticipating further discussion, it may be stated right
now that, -after the Constitutional Amendment of February 1, 1944, the
administration of foreign and military affairs has been entrusted to
commissariats of this type.
(3) Finally, the republican level of administration (corresponding
to state administration in this country) is represented by republican
commissariats the heads of which participate in the Councils of People's
Commissars of the constituent republics and are subordinate to these
Councils, but to no person or agency on the federal level.26 Today the
number of these commissariats is small; only public education, local
industry, local transportation, social security and public utilities are
organized according to this pattern.17 Since it is only on this level that
the constituent republics exert an autonomy similar to that of the states
in this country, the limited scope of their autonomy is beyond dispute.
24. The system of joint administration was used in the German Empire and was
expanded by the Weimar Constitution. Whether the drafters of the Soviet Constitution
were aware of this precedent, is unknown.
25. This dual subordination could bring about insoluble conflicts. In reality, none occur
since all the persons involved (People's Commissars of different ranks) belong to the
Communist Party and consequently receive consistent directions from the top of the
Party organization.
26. This is correct on the constitutional level. In reality, as members of the Party,
the heads of the republican commissariats are under the orders of the central agencies of
the Party located in Moscow.
27. It is noteworthy that the original Union Constitution of 1923 granted the con-
stituent republics a substantially larger scope of autonomy; internal affairs (including
police), agriculture, justice and public health were entrusted to "republican commissariats,"
in addition to the branches mentioned in the text. The process of centralization started
in 1930 and continued up to the Amendment of February 1, 1944.
[Vol. 14
THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER
III.
The Constitutional Amendment of February 1, 1944, which has pre-
ceded the Soviet claim for three seats in the United Nations Conference"
has not brought about any substantial change in the political framework
just described. The particular changes have been these: (1) the articles
of the Constitution concerning the powers of the constituent republics
have been reworded to acknowledge their participation in diplomatic
and military affairs; (2) the list of the federal powers has been reworded,
to give room to concurrent powers of the constituent republics in these
affairs; (3) the People's Commissariats of Foreign Affairs and Defense
have been moved from the rank of Union commissariats to that of
Union-republican commissariats. More precisely:
1. The articles concerning the powers of the constituent republics
have received these modifications. Article 18 which, prior to the reform,
merely established the principle that the territory of the constituent
republics could not be changed without their consent has been continued
in this way: "Each constituent republic is entitled to enter into direct
relations with foreign powers, conclude agreements with them and ex-
change with them diplomatic and consular representation. Each republic
has its own military detachments." Moreover, Article 60 establishing
the powers of the Supreme Soviet of a constituent republic has been
expanded by these two items: (e) the creation of the representation
of the republic in foreign relations and (f) the establishment of the
method of the formation of the military detachments of the republic.
2. The change in the list of federal powers aiming at its restrictions
has been carried out in a very awkward way, namely by the addition
of new statements. Article 14, Section (a) of the Constitution has
been continued by words of this import: the establishment of general
relations between the individual constituent republics and foreign
powers. Obviously, the word "general" must be emphasized, and the
meaning of the addition is that relations of a more particular type do
no longer belong to the powers of the Union. In a similar way, Sec-
tion (g) of the same Article has been continued by words of this import:
the establishment of the general principles of the organization of the
armed forces of the constituent republics. The meaning is exactly the
same as stated above: general principles must be opposed to technical
questions which do not belong to the powers of the Union and therefore
must belong to the jurisdiction of the constituent republics.
28. There exists however a reliable report according to which already in 1943 the
Soviet Union claimed seven seats in the War Criminals Committee, one for each of the
constituent republics on the territory of which atrocities had been committed (N. Y.
Times, Dec. 21, 1943, p. 3, col. 1).
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3. Most important is however the transformation of the Comms-
sariats of Foreign Affairs and Defense into Union-republican ones. Up
to the reform, they were Union commissariats; as has been shown above,
this meant that, then, diplomatic and military affairs were conducted
exclusively by the Union, whereas representatives of these commissariats
in the Councils of People's Commissars of the constituent republics could
exert some pressure on the agencies of the republics, to coordinate their
activities with the diplomatic and military requirements.
If these commissariats would have become republican, this would have
meant that, in the framework of the Constitution,2 9 the constituent re-
publics would have received the right to conduct independently their
diplomatic and military affairs, with no interference from the Union
level legally possible.
But this has not happened. The Constitutional Amendment has
shifted military and diplomatic affairs to the level of "joint adminis-
tration". This means that, both relating to foreign affairs and defense,
there will be seventeen commissariats, one central in Moscow and one
local in each of the constituent republics. According to the very Consti-
tution, the central commissariats will direct their branches of adminis-
tration partly through the local commissariats, partly directly, the em-
bassies of the Union and the Union Army becoming "enterprises" in
the meaning of Article 76 explained above. The local commissariats
which will take the place of the former representatives of the Union
commissariats in the individual republics, will carry out the limited
diplomatic and military functions granted to the constituent republics
by the Amendment, but, according to Article 87 of the Constitution,
even relating to these affairs they remain in the state of subordination
to the "like-named" central commissariats. The inevitable conclusion
is this: the constituent republics have not been granted real autonomy
in foreign and military affairs, but have been granted participation in
these affairs which have become joint enterprises of the Union and
the republics.
On the basis of the very text of the laws of February 1, 1944, the
system must function approximately in this way:
1. In addition to the ambassadors and consuls appointed by the
Union, the constituent republics may appoint their diplomatic and
consular representatives (provided that foreign powers will agree to
receive them), and receive such representatives of foreign powers (pro-
vided that foreign powers will appoint them). The new representatives
29. On this occasion, the constitutional framework must be opposed to the framework
of the Party statute which, as has already been mentioned, operates with the scheme of
the one and indivisible Union Party.
[Vol. 14
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will be under the immediate orders of the commissariats of the individual
republics, but these commissariats must obey the directions of the cen-
tral Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. The constituent republics may
conclude agreements with foreign powers, but of a rather particular
(in opposition to general) character. However, the ratification of such
agreements belongs to the powers of the Union which has also preserved
the power to conclude general agreements (treaties). Very definitely,
the constituent republics have received no power to declare war and
restore peace.30 In this regard they are of a significantly inferior status
than the British dominions. Incidentally, diplomatic relations with for-
eign powers belonged to the prerogatives of the States of the German
Empire, according to the Constitution of 1871. Up to 1914, there were
in St. Petersburg, in addition to the German ambassador, representatives
of Bavaria, Wuertemberg, Saxony and Baden, and in the same states
and a few more, representatives of the Russian Empire were present.
rThese* representatives never were very busy; their main task was to
congratulate the members of the ruling houses on the occasion of their
birthdays and wedding anniversaries. Time and again, treaties on the
extradition of criminals and on the execution of judicial decisions were
signed.' It is however, not easy to figure out what a representative
of Uzbekistan in Belgium or a Brazilian minister in Turkmenistan could
do. An agreement between the Ukrainian and Byelorussian republics
on the one hand and Poland on the other hand has been reported as
to the exchange of minorities.' But hardly could any difficulty have
arisen if the negotiations were conducted by the Union Commissariat
and, moreover, Poland was then represented by a Soviet-made National
Committee.
.2. As to military affairs, the situation is this. Instead of the already
existing military detachments consisting of nationals of a particular
republic, military detachments constitutionally linked to these republics
will be created. But the leading principles of their organization will
be established by the organs of the Union, whereas the organs of the
constituent republics will establish the methods of their formation. These
military detachments will be under the immediate orders of the defense
commissariats of the constituent republics. But the latter, superseding
the representatives of the Union commissariat of defense in the particu-
lar republics, will, according to the very text of the Constitution, be
30. Art. 14, § (b) of the Constitution has not been amended.
31. In the old German Empire, civil and criminal justice belonged to the number of
State powers. But, according to the Soviet Constitution, justice is part of the "joint
administration;" therefore, separate treaties on extradition and the like are improbable.
32. N. Y. Times, September 15, 1944, p. 5, col. 1.
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subordinate to the central Commissariat of Defense. By no means has
the Union renounced the right to have a Union Army. Up to the end
of the war, no particular reference to military detachments of the
particular republics could be found in the leading Soviet press. Inci-
dentally, the Ukrainian and White Russian (Byelorussian) "fronts"
which have conquered Poland and Eastern Germany were neither
armies of the corresponding republics nor armies consisting of their
nationals.33 The terms simply designated the location of these "fronts"
at the beginning of the decisive offensive of 1944, in addition to such
fronts as Baltic and Leningrad.
In conclusion it may be said that the new liberties granted to the
constituent republics of the Soviet Union are strangely similar to rights
belonging to the individual states of this country, whereas, up to the
change, these republics were inferior in status as compared with the
states of this Union. The military detachments of the constituent re-
publics are analogous to the militia of the states, trained and officered
by them, and the rather vague right of the states to have relations with
foreign powers is analogous to the right of sixteen republics to conclude
agreements with foreign powers; to the consent of the Congress the
consent of the Central Commissariat of Foreign Affairs is a kind of
counterpart. Only the right to exchange representatives with foreign
powers exceeds the rights of the states. But, as has been shown above,
these representatives are finally under the order of the central Com-
missariat of Foreign Affairs.
The corollary is this: if two or, later on, more constituent republics
of the Soviet Union are entitled to seats in the General Assembly of the
United Nations, then each of the forty-eight states of the United
States is also entitled. No analogy with the members of the British
Commonwealth of Nations is possible since these members are really
entitled to independent diplomatic relations, including the right of war
and peace, and to the raising of their own armies, whereas there exists
no such thing as the diplomacy of the army of the Commonwealth.
After discussion, the anomalies pointed to in the very beginning of this
paper have not been disposed of, but, on the contrary, appear real and
startling: the three Soviet seats in the General Assembly of the United
Nations belong not to three independent political units, but to one and
the same unit represented by its central and two subordinate local
governments.
33. The names have deceived even outstanding columnists in this country who expressed
their amazement at the fact that the major republic of the Union, the Russian one,
did not participate in the common effort.
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